as indexing tools rather than in branding their products. 9 All of these "trademark use" exemptions share two features in common: "the defendant has used the mark in [some] . . . non-source-identifying (and non-sponsorship-identifying) way; and . . . the error costs from a pro-plaintiff verdict are high." 10 The trademark use doctrine thus serves as a buffer, protecting certain classes of behavior from liability without the uncertainties associated with the traditional "likelihood of confusion" test.
11

B. Importance in Dilution Cases
In the dilution context, the need for a trademark use buffer is particularly acute. Unlike traditional trademark infringement -in which confusion over source or sponsorship lies at the heart of the claim 12 -dilution turns on murkier concepts of "blurring" and "tarnishment" that do not on their face depend on consumer perceptions as to the source of a defendant's product. 13 Dilution, . We have more confidence than McKenna does in the courts' ability to carve out some categories of behavior that, as a matter of law, do not constitute trademark use, and we are skeptical of the courts' ability to interpret likelihood of confusion to achieve the same result in a way that avoids enormous cost and uncertainty. [Vol. 24 moreover, does not involve deceptive or confusing speech, or any "fraud on the consuming public."
14 As a result, a broad, open-ended dilution statute could target any unauthorized use of a famous trademark, almost without limitation. After all, virtually any reference to a trademark influences the consumer's mental association regarding the brand, in ways that one could characterize as "tarnishing" or "diluting" the trademark holder's carefully crafted commercial identity. 15 Numerous scholars have explored the costs (and fallacies) associated with such an expansive approach to dilution. Jessica Litman and Rochelle Dreyfuss have critiqued the core notion underlying the dilution theory -the idea of a singular, corporatecrafted brand meaning disengaged from any public role in shaping brand identity. 16 broadly defined dilution law could potentially apply to parodies, news reports, consumer commentaries, blog entries, comparative advertising, and a whole host of other means through which speakers inform and enrich our society.
The trademark use doctrine offers a safeguard against dilution law's slippery slope. Dilution law, properly conceived, protects famous marks against uses that interfere with their function as sourceidentifiers.
18
It should not reach every use that affects a mark's meaning, lest it turn into an über-right that would defeat the very purpose of trademark laws. A robust trademark use doctrine distinguishes between uses that interfere with the source-identifying function of a trademark, on the one hand, and uses that, if anything, affect the mark's meaning as the famous trademark, on the other.
II. THE USE REQUIREMENT BEFORE 2006 -"COMMERCIAL USE IN COMMERCE"
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Congress's first foray into dilution law, applied only to the "commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name . . . [that] causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."
19 The statute also specifically exempted "noncommercial use of a mark" from dilution liability. 20 The legislative history made clear that Congress intended 'commercial use' to cover only those uses that would constitute "commercial speech," as that term is understood in First Amendment jurisprudence. 21 Commercial speech is speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,'" 22 which, in the trademark context, means a use that has no expressive function except as a brand. 25 for example, the court found a commercial use by a website operator because (1) the website was plugging a third party's book (but obtaining no financial gain from book sales or otherwise), (2) the defendant was politically active and solicited donations (albeit none from his website) for his anti-abortion activities, and (3) the use had a negative effect on the plaintiff's commercial activities.
26
Margreth Barrett has complained that courts repeatedly misunderstood the commercial use requirement in ways that have "significantly impaired First Amendment interests."
27
Over time, however, judges applying the FTDA showed an increasing recognition of the equivalence between "commercial use in commerce" and "commercial speech." In recent years, virtually all courts have shown a reluctance to enjoin behavior that does not use the trademark as a brand in some way. 28 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition makes it clear that dilution law imposes such a noncommercial because "the song also lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she represents."). The legislative history provides additional indirect support for the position that the FTDA was concerned only with branding-type uses of famous marks. In testimony and Congressional reports, legislators repeatedly offered "DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos" as examples of the harms the statute was intended to address. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) Given the legislative history, and the otherwiseinexplicable choice of the inartful phrase "commercial use in commerce," we think this was the right understanding of that language.
III. THE USE REQUIREMENT UNDER THE TDRA
A. What the TDRA Does
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 30 which held that the original 1996 statute applied only in cases where the plaintiff could prove "actual dilution," rather than mere likelihood of dilution.
31 That decision also questioned whether tarnishment could ever constitute dilution. 32 Together, these holdings made it extraordinarily difficult for plaintiffs to prove a dilution claim. 33 They also created an odd disconnect between the liability structure of the dilution law and its remedies. The ordinary remedy in dilution cases is an injunction against future diluting efforts. 34 But it makes little sense to require plaintiffs to wait until their mark is actually diluted, and then offer them only an injunction against future dilution -rather like closing the barn door after the horse is gone.
Congress acted to undo the effect of Moseley, both by restoring the likelihood of dilution standard that was the majority rule before Moseley 35 and by making it clear that the cause of action extended to tarnishment as well. 36 It also reversed the holding of the Second Circuit that had prevented descriptive marks such as McDONALDS from ever qualifying for dilution protection, 37 Not all the changes in the law expanded protections for trademark owners, however. Responding to a number of courts that had expanded dilution protection beyond nationally famous marks to include a number of rather obscure ones, 39 Congress changed the law to make it clear that a famous mark must be "widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States." 40 In so doing, it eliminated the concept of "niche fame" in particular regions or among specialized groups, and made it clear to courts that dilution was a law to be applied sparingly. Further, Congress substantially expanded the list of exclusions from the reach of the dilution statute, expressly including parody, criticism, commentary, nominative and descriptive fair use in addition to previous exceptions from the reach of the act. [C]ourts applying the state and federal dilution statutes have been quite willing to conclude that a local favorite, or a rather obscure company, is 'famous' within the meaning of the Act. Thus, marks such as Intermatic, Gazette, Dennison, Nailtiques, TeleTech, Wedgewood (for new homes, not china), Papal Visit 1999 and Wawa have been declared famous. Other courts had been willing to apply dilution without even finding fame. One commentator reports that of the 16 cases she examined, "half did not make an explicit finding that the mark in question was famous, or made such a finding only by confusing fame with distinctiveness." Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment The final change -and the one with which we are concernedinvolves the TDRA's clarification that the defendant must make use of its own "mark or trade name" to violate the statute. 43 In particular, the TDRA, unlike the FTDA, distinguishes between the "mark or trade name" used by the defendant and the "famous mark." 44 To 42. Id. § 1125(c)(6) . This section now provides that a defendant's federal registration is a complete bar not only to a state dilution claim but also to any claim "of actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of a mark", id., apparently whether brought on the basis of state or federal law. While the plain language of this provision would appear to bar all federal dilution claims against owners of registered marks, the language almost certainly resulted from a drafting error. The original House bill provided that federal registration:
[S]hall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, 44. The FTDA also referred to "use … of a mark or trade name," but unlike the TDRA, the grammatical context of that sentence suggested that the "mark or trade name" referred to in the old statute was the plaintiff's famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (limiting dilution to a "person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use . . . causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark"). At a minimum, this language did not clearly distinguish between the "mark or trade name" used by the defendant, on the one hand, and the famous mark, on the other. That language did not, standing alone, create a trademark use requirement in the FTDA; that requirement was found in the awkward and oft-misunderstood phrase "commercial use in commerce." The TDRA eliminates this ambiguity by clearly distinguishing between the defendant's mark or trade name, on the one hand, and the diluting effect on the famous mark, on the other. And it repeatedly invokes that distinction. The structure of the TDRA thus emphasizes and reinforces the significance of the trademark use requirement in a way that the FTDA did not. . The entire structure of the sentence was changed in a way that makes it clear that both the defendant and the plaintiff must have separate marks in order for the statute to apply. Barber's proffered explanation -that the reference to the defendant's use of "a mark or trade name" is meant to refer to use of the plaintiff's mark -has another problem as well. It would limit the scope of dilution to defendant's marks that are identical to the plaintiff's, since
[Vol. 24 understand the effect of this language, it is necessary to look at it in the context in which it appears in the statute: . . . . otherwise the defendant would not be using the plaintiff's mark or trade name. Under Barber's interpretation, therefore, Congress inadvertently excluded from the scope of dilution any uses by defendants of terms that were not identical to the plaintiff's mark, including Moseley's use of Victor's Secret. It need hardly be said that an interpretation of the statute that fails to overrule the very case Congress intended to overrule is likely not the correct one. The grammatical structure of this statute is clear. The defendant's use -the thing that may cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment -is not just any use or reference to the plaintiff's famous mark, but a specific, limited class of uses -use of a term by the defendant as "a mark or trade name." 46 It is only such a use that can cause the injury described in section (2), and can give rise to the remedies in sections (1) and (5).
47
It is equally clear from this language that the reference to the defendant's "mark or trade name" is not just a placeholder for use of the plaintiff's mark. There are two marks being discussed in the statute -"the famous mark" owned by the plaintiff and the "mark or trade name" used in commerce by the defendant. 48 This is evident from the repeated references to the two in the same sentence, which would make no sense if the two marks were the same, and from the repeated references to similarities, differences and associations between the famous mark and the defendant's "mark or trade name." It follows that the only actionable "uses" by a defendant of the plaintiff's famous mark are those in which a defendant uses a trademark or trade name to identify and distinguish its own goods and services. Other uses alleged to dilute cannot satisfy the terms of the statute.
The legislative history of the TDRA is generally unhelpful, but to the extent anything can be gleaned from it, it supports the commonsense reading of the statute set forth above. 52 The original version of the statute supported by the International Trademark Association (INTA) required that the defendant make use of a "designation of source." 53 The Committee Chair accordingly referred to dilution as "arising from the similarity between a source designation and a famous mark."
54 Bill Barber objected on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) that the term "designation of source" did not have a settled meaning in trademark law, claiming (wrongly) that it was a "completely new requirement in dilution jurisprudence" rather than a replacement for the "commercial use in commerce" language, 55 and proposed a different approach 51. Id. 52. Bill Barber's description of the TDRA's "legislative history" illustrates not only the danger of private lawmaking, but the unreliability of unwritten witness accounts of such lawmaking. Barber, supra note 44, at __. He claims that the interested private parties had reached a "consensus" that the TDRA, as enacted, reflected no trademark use requirement. Id. at xxx But he fails to point to any concrete support for such a private consensus, let alone any consensus among the legislators who passed this federal law. To the contrary, at least two of the parties that testified before Congress about trademark use -Mark Lemley and Anne Gundelfinger, the then-president of the International Trademark Organization (INTA) -have an understanding that comports with the plain reading of the statute and the one we articulate here: that the TDRA requires trademark use as a basis for liability.
53 Rather than accept Barber's suggestion, the committee simply dropped the term "designation of source" and left in place "mark or trade name," following INTA's explanation that "[d]esignation of source" is an accepted term of art in trademark law that is easily understandable . . . . [It] simply requires that, in order for a dilution case to proceed, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is using the challenged mark as a mark or name for his own company, goods, or services. 57 Thus, it seems evident that the committee resolved this dispute in favor of maintaining a trademark use requirement in the dilution statute, merely eliminating the proposed "designation of source" language in favor of language that meant the same thing and was already defined in the statute.
This reading is also consistent with House Chairman Lamar Smith's statement that the bill did not break new ground, and "represents a clarification of what Congress meant when it passed the dilution statute almost a decade ago."
58 Given the existence of the "commercial use in commerce" requirement in the old statute, setting forth trademark use as a prerequisite to liability, it seems quite clear that the House did not intend to drop any trademark use requirement and therefore to expand dilution law dramatically to permit suits against dictionaries, parodists, and a host of others who are not using the plaintiff's mark to sell anything. 56. Specifically, Barber suggested defining dilution by blurring as "impairment of association between the famous mark and a single source" Hearing on H.R. 683, supra note 53, at 29. This language contrasts sharply with the definition ultimately adopted, which concerns itself only with impairments to a mark's distinctiveness that result from "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark" 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007 59. Cf. id. at 26 (Barber's suggestion that dilution law be expanded to permit lawsuits against those who use a term in its generic sense against the wishes of the trademark owner, and that the trademark use requirement needed to be dropped from the statute to achieve that result.). While Barber's testimony and article read as though trademark owners had an established right to sue those who use a term in its generic sense, no court has established such a right, and the SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
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Finally, we think this understanding is consistent with the language of subsection (3), which provides a host of "exclusions" from the reach of the dilution statute. Those exclusions include two more provisions that might be thought to establish a trademark use requirement: section (c)(3)(A), which protects "any fair use . . . of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services," and section (c)(3)(C), which protects "[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark." 60 We acknowledge that the presence of these three different takes on the same basic issue is confusing, and might even lead some to suggest that the references to "mark or trade name" in the other subsections should not be read to mean what they say. But we think that is the wrong approach. Like the 1996 Act before it, which spoke of "commercial use in commerce" and separately exempted "noncommercial use of a mark,"
61 Congress in the 2006 revisions appeared to take a "belt and suspenders" approach, throwing in a variety of language in an effort to define a universe of conduct the new law did not reach. For example, it included separate exclusions for "commenting upon the famous mark owner" and for "news commentary," 62 but there is no reason to believe that one of these provisions limits or renders inoperative the other. Rather, Congress was trying to make sure that this conduct -and uses other than those of a mark or trade namewas not covered by the statute. That overlap may mean that one or more of these provisions end up being superfluous, 63 but that is better than the alternative. It would be perverse to conclude that an excess of Congressional enthusiasm for the trademark use requirement should be interpreted to have the opposite effect of undermining it. 64. It is also worth noting that 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) is styled as "exclusions" from the scope of the act, not as defenses to an otherwise viable cause of action, further undermining the idea that the presence of a "designation of source" or "noncommercial use" limitation in that section implies that the general bill reaches further than that. Indeed, the fact that none of these exclusions applies if a defendant is using a mark as a source-identifier reinforces the notion that a defendant's source-identifying use is what triggers the statute.
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The only appellate decision thus far addressing the TDRA appears to recognize the statute's requirement of trademark use. In Louis Vuitton v. Haute Diggity Dog, 68 the Fourth Circuit considered a dilution claim by Louis Vuitton against the seller of a "Chewy Vuitton" brand squeak toy whose brand was an obvious parody of the famous fashion house. The court recognized that the parody did not fall within the statutory "fair use" exception, because the defendant had used the parody as a designation of source. 69 At the same time, the court agreed with the district court that the parody did not "blur" the distinctiveness of the Louis Vuitton mark. 70 For several reasonsbecause the defendant mimicked the mark rather than replicating it, 71 because the parody successfully simultaneously evoked and poked fun, 72 and because the mark was so famous that the public would get the joke 73 -the court held that Louis Vuitton had not met its burden of proving likelihood of dilution.
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While Louis Vuitton did not directly address the TDRA's trademark use requirement because the defendant had clearly engaged in a trademark use, the court's opinion reinforces the notion that the TDRA limits itself to defendants who use marks as brands. Throughout the opinion, the court described dilution as the statute does: a defendant's use of a mark in a way that dilutes a famous mark's distinctiveness. 75 
